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How Bourdieu bites back: recognising misrecognition in education
and educational research
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Having noted that some use of Bourdieusian concepts in educational research is
superﬁcial, this paper offers a view of the distinctiveness of Bourdieu’s concepts
via the example of misrecognition, which is differentiated from the concept with
the same name in Fraser’s work. An account is given of a recent research project
on white middle-class identity and school choice, which suggests that whilst par-
ents avoided a common misrecognition (regarding school quality), they were
nevertheless reliant on other forms of misrecognition (regarding the qualities of
their children) that are equally important in the relationship between social class
and educational inequalities. Finally, the paper suggests that educational under-
standings, including some educational research, are predisposed to misrecognise
Bourdieusian concepts, and four areas of tension are identiﬁed. The paper argues
against ‘light usage’ of Bourdieu whilst acknowledging that the approach can
produce a pessimistic account that is at odds with some educational values.
Keywords: misrecognition; Bourdieu; educational research; middle-class school
choice
Introduction
Many educational researchers ﬁnd Bourdieu’s concepts attractive and useful, though
there is great variability in what we might call ‘depth in use’. Undoubtedly, some
usage remains at the level of what Reay described as ‘the habitual use of Habitus’
(Reay, 2004), or what Hey (2003) termed ‘intellectual hairspray’. This paper sets out
an argument that, at least in the case of educational research, the superﬁcial use of
Bourdieusian tools is likely to be due to (a) the apparent similarity of other concepts
with similar names, and (b) important tensions between a Bourdieusian approach
and some key characteristics of educational practice, policy and research
To do this, the paper begins with a comparison of the concept of misrecognition
as this appears in the hands of Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu, respectively, argu-
ing that the ﬁrst is more readily understood than the second, and that whilst the con-
cepts overlap they are crucially different. It then looks at the concept of
misrecognition as this applies to the analysis of some of the data in a research pro-
ject entitled ‘Identities, Educational Choice and the White Urban Middle Classes’,
which studied 125 families in three English cities to investigate motives, experiences
and outcomes where families made ‘against the grain’ choices of secondary school.
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The argument here is that the families concerned identiﬁed and avoided one very
common and powerful form of misrecognition, but that other forms of misrecogni-
tion remained key in their engagements with education. Finally, having identiﬁed
areas of tension, I argue that whilst it is understandable, ‘light usage’ of Bourdieu is
of little value and that the tendency to pessimism in Bourdieusian social theory
presents particular difﬁculties to educationists.
Misrecognition: Fraser and Bourdieu
It is tempting to illustrate the potential confusion between Bourdieusian concepts
and other similar-sounding concepts with the example of social capital: When
Puttnam’s concept with the same name was taken up and used widely by some
national governments and international organisations in the early 2000s, many of
those wishing to use Bourdieu’s concept often found themselves explaining the con-
trast with Puttnam and Coleman (see for example Blackshaw & Long, 2005). Here,
my focus is on misrecognition, a term central to the work of both Nancy Fraser and
Pierre Bourdieu in the sets of ideas they each provide that can help in the task of
investigating, understanding and ameliorating aspects of the social world. The
philosophical relationship between Fraser’s and Bourdieu’s thinking is helpfully
explored in an edited collection (Lovell, 2007), inspired by an exchange between
Honneth and Fraser in which Bourdieu was ‘a tacit third party’ (Lovell, 2007,
p. 67). Whilst the detail of Lovell’s account is beyond the scope of the current paper,
it is worth noting Lovell’s strong implication that there is both an afﬁnity and a
useful complementarity:
Fraser holds the place … for participatory parity, dialogics and agency in normative
social transformation. Bourdieu, on the other hand, holds the place for the powers that
thwart these processes and that condition and shape agency…. He is a pessimist rather
than a determinist, and his pessimism is sometimes salutary. (Lovell, 2007, p. 7)
This complementarity might lead one to expect that misrecognition, a prominent
term in the work of both theorists, refers to a similar set of concerns. However,
whilst they are related, the concepts of misrecognition in the work of each actually
refer to different processes.
In Fraser’s hands, the concept of misrecognition refers to one of two ‘distinct
species of injustice’:
(T)he most general meaning of justice is parity of participation. According to this
radical-democratic interpretation of the principle of equal moral worth, justice requires
social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. Overcoming
injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from
participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction. Previously, I
have analysed two distinct kinds of obstacles to participatory parity, which correspond
to two distinct species of injustice … On the one hand, people can be impeded from
full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in
order to interact with others as peers; in that case they suffer from distributive injustice
or maldistribution. On the other hand, people can also be prevented from interacting
on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the
requisite standing; in that case they suffer from status inequality or misrecognition.
(Fraser, 2007, p. 20)
As in Weber’s sociology, these ‘class structure’ and ‘status order’ dimensions have a
degree of autonomy and do not neatly mirror each other in modern capitalist
98 D. James
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societies. They can interact in a causal way, but neither can be collapsed into the
other. This dual framework for looking at and thinking about social justice is now
widely known and appreciated. Fraser has, however, augmented it in later work, tak-
ing into account the limitations of considering justice issues mainly or only within a
particular concept of the territorial state. Globalisation makes us question the previ-
ously largely unexamined assumptions that justice itself was to be understood within
what Fraser calls the ‘Keynesian-Westphalian frame’.
The third dimension of justice is the political. Of course, distribution and recognition
are themselves political…. But I mean political in a more speciﬁc, constitutive sense
… (which) furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are
played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus determining who counts
as a member, the political dimension of justice speciﬁes the reach of those other
dimensions: it tells us who is included, and who excluded, from the circle of those
entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition. (Fraser, 2007, pp. 20–21)
The Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now ﬁrmly part of the problem – ‘as it parti-
tions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from chal-
lenging the forces that oppress them … this frame insulates offshore powers from
critique and control’ (Fraser, 2007, p. 23).
For Fraser, then, misrecognition includes the denial of common humanity or citi-
zenship, and the equal worth that ﬂows from that (see Lister, 2007, p. 164). Her con-
cepts of recognition and misrecognition include but are not conﬁned to questions of
identity, group identity and the psychological damage to individual selves that might
follow denigration of a group. Her ‘status model’ is primarily about material condi-
tions – whether or not people have ‘participatory parity’ – that is, whether or not
they are full partners in social interaction (for Lister, Fraser underplays the psychic
harm that ﬂows from misrecognition, and she gives an example from Adair’s work
on poverty to illustrate – see ibid., p. 165). In Fraser’s developed model, the ‘eco-
nomic realm’ concepts (maldistribution/redistribution) and those of the ‘cultural
realm’ (recognition/misrecognition) are augmented with those pertaining to the polit-
ical realm, that is, inclusion, exclusion and marginalisation. Together these offer a
means to explore and understand injustice, whether it is that following from the
denial of ‘voice’ to certain social groups, for example that suffered by workers in
garment factories supplying consumer markets in the West, or that produced by the
operation of categories of citizen, immigrant, migrant worker, refugee or asylum-
seeker. One particularly interesting application of this framework uses it to examine
post-1944 education policy in England, illustrating a shift through policies that focus
on redistribution, then recognition, then representation (Power, 2012). There is a
strong resonance between Fraser’s three realms and Bourdieu’s concept of ﬁeld, spe-
ciﬁcally that persons are differentially positioned in ﬁelds by virtue of the capitals to
which they have access. A good example here might be a well-qualiﬁed professional
who settles in a new country and ﬁnds that his/her standing and qualiﬁcations are
not recognised in the new setting.
However, Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition is different, and it arises from
his central concern with social practices in social spaces or ﬁelds. In Bourdieu’s
view, social ﬁelds produce knowledge, and knowledge is a form of capital, associ-
ated with prestige or power. Crucially, ‘knowledge’ here is a translation of the
French word ‘connaissance’, so does not only refer to knowledge of facts or
knowledge about things, as usually implied in phrases like ‘knowledge is power’ or
‘the knowledge economy’: it also means being familiar in an implicit or tacit way,
Cambridge Journal of Education 99
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and knowing how to do things, such as how to act or how to engage in different
social situations or in relation to different orthodoxies. The close connection with
‘habitus’ is clear, in the sense given in that most well-known of all Bourdieu quotes:
‘when the habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it ﬁnds itself
“as a ﬁsh in water”, it does not feel the weight of water and takes the world about
itself for granted’ (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 43). It is only through appreciating this mean-
ing of ‘knowledge’ that we can fully grasp the related terms, namely ‘reconnais-
sance’ (knowing again – recognition) and ‘meconnaissance’ (misrecognition). The
latter term is not about recognition or the lack of it in Fraser’s terms, but rather
refers to a social practice of individual or collective misattribution:
Misrecognition relates to the ways … (that) underlying processes and generating struc-
tures of ﬁelds are not consciously acknowledged in terms of the social differentiation
they perpetuate, often in the name of democracy and equality…. As a translation of
meconnaissance, however, misrecognition does not quite place the necessary emphasis
on how a practice might be made “…invisible through a displacement of understanding
and a reconstrual as part of other aspects of the habitus that ‘go without saying’”
(Mahar et al., 1990, p. 19). Such misrecognition operates in the education system,
Bourdieu argues, through an arbitrary curriculum that is “naturalised” so that social
classiﬁcations are transformed into academic ones. The result is that instead of being
experienced for what they are (i.e. partial and technical hierarchies), such social
classiﬁcations become “total” hierarchies, experienced as if they were grounded in
nature. (Grenfell & James, 1998, pp. 23–24)
For Bourdieu, then, misrecognition refers to an everyday and dynamic social process
where one thing (say, a situation, process, or action) is not recognised for what it is
because it was not previously ‘cognised’ within the range of dispositions and pro-
pensities of the habitus of the person(s) confronting it (see Bourdieu, 2000). Instead
the thing is attributed to another available realm of meaning, and, in the process,
interests, inequities or other effects may be maintained whilst they remain concealed.
An everyday example of this would be the contemporary use of supermarket and
retail loyalty cards. These are deliberately presented (and conventionally regarded)
as a system for rewarding repeat custom through the accumulation of points that
represent cash value. However, they are also (one might say really) a system for
harvesting detailed information about consumption that enables new forms of indi-
vidually targeted marketing. Customers are likely to attribute actions around loyalty
cards to the realm of customer loyalty, whereas it could be argued that they are sell-
ing detailed information on their purchasing habits to a group of retailers, who are
then in a much better position to secure further proﬁt from the same individuals.
Another everyday example is the way that most mobile phone use is carried out
without much awareness that it generates a vast amount of detailed data that has
high value to those able to generate new forms of proﬁtable business. As both exam-
ples illustrate, the concept of misrecognition is linked to Bourdieu’s rejection of any
simple distinction between the conscious and unconscious: Many people half know
that something else is going on with their loyalty card, but that is not the same thing
as saying that this vague awareness comes to the surface in conscious and calculated
decisions about how to act, such as whether or not to use their loyalty card. The
example also illustrates another important point: that misrecognition is ‘functional’
rather than simply aberrant or some sort of unintended by-product. Bourdieu would
describe it thus:
100 D. James
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In an economy which is deﬁned by the refusal to recognise the ‘objective’ truth of
‘economic’ practices, that is, the law of ‘naked self-interest’ and egoistic calculation,
even ‘economic’ capital cannot act unless it succeeds in being recognized through a
conversion that can render unrecognizable the true principle of its efﬁcacy. Symbolic
capital is thus denied capital, recognized as legitimate, that is, misrecognised as
capital…. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 118)
The classic example of educational misrecognition refers to the general relationship
of educational success to social advantage. The common-sense assumption here is
rather like traditional functionalist sociology – that social background does affect
educational progress and achievement, but that the fact it does so is an unfortunate
anomaly, an aberration or dysfunctional feature of an otherwise largely benign and
socially neutral process. Common sense has it that education should not really
generate social inequality and that it doesn’t have to, and that action to overcome
this effect is about identifying and then removing the ‘barriers’, or perhaps ‘raising
standards for all’. Bourdieu explicitly counters this view:
Misrecognition of the social determinants of the educational career – and therefore of
the social trajectory it helps to determine – gives the educational certiﬁcate the value
of a natural right and makes the educational system one of the fundamental agencies of
the maintenance of the social order. (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 387)
Here, the ‘social order’ includes ongoing social inequality, within which certain
forms of a lack of recognition (misrecognition in the Fraser sense) will play a large
part. Clearly, both Fraser and Bourdieu are concerned with social inequalities and
how they may be understood, challenged, reduced or overcome, yet their distinct
concepts of misrecognition also point to different starting-points and projects. In one
sense Fraser’s concept of misrecognition is close to Bourdieu’s symbolic violence,
because those excluded or without a voice are denied part of what it is to be fully
human, and this appears at least psychologically abusive. However, the concept of
symbolic violence, and that of symbolic capital, represents an important part of
Bourdieu’s break with Marxism (for a good account of this, and of the various theo-
retical traditions brought together by Bourdieu, see Swartz, 1997). For Bourdieu,
most domination in advanced societies is now symbolic rather than achieved by
force and, furthermore, the process is not one of simply ‘duping’ people or ﬂooding
them with propaganda, or even persuading them. Domination usually involves at
least some sense of largely below-conscious complicity on the part of those subju-
gated, and processes of misrecognition are what make this possible: ‘symbolic vio-
lence is that form of violence which only acts on social agents with their
complicity’ (Poupeau, 2000, p. 71).
Putting Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition to work
Given its centrality in Bourdieu’s theoretical tools, it is at ﬁrst surprising to ﬁnd that
the concept of misrecognition is not as widely used as concepts like cultural and
social capital in contemporary educational research. A notable exception would be
Thompson’s recent critique of the notion of ‘scaling up’ (Thomson, 2014).
Misrecognition was, however, central to the UK Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC)-funded project ‘Identity, Educational Choice and the White Urban
Middle Classes’ (Award reference RES-148-25-0023), which investigated a
cross-section of ‘against the grain’ examples of school choice, where white urban
Cambridge Journal of Education 101
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middle-class families in England eschewed more apparently dependable state and
private alternatives available to them and instead chose ordinary state comprehensive
secondary schools for their children. The purposes of the study included attempting
to understand school choice practices and processes in terms of orientations and
motivations, and ethnicity and class, and it aimed to investigate how such practices
were related to identity and identiﬁcation in the light of contemporary conceptions
of the middle-class self. The investigation included interviewing parents and chil-
dren in 125 white middle-class households in London and two provincial cities in
England, ‘Riverton’ in the South West and ‘Norton’ in the North East.1 These fami-
lies had all made a positive choice in favour of a state secondary school that was
performing at or below the England average according to conventional examination
league-tables. The study began in mid-2005 and covered a 30-month period, con-
cluding in 2007, and was part of the ESRC Identities and Social Action Programme.
The outcomes of the study are extensively reported elsewhere (e.g. Crozier et al.,
2008; James et al., 2010; Reay et al., 2007; Reay et al., 2008; Reay et al., 2011
[2013]): Here, some brief details are given to contextualise the discussion, but the
main purpose is to consider how Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition was put to
work in the study, and to give some consideration of how this illuminates a tension
between a Bourdieu-inspired approach and some common values and
understandings that run through the world of education.
One of the most striking ﬁndings was that surprisingly few of the ‘against-the-
grain’ school choices could be attributed to strong commitments to the welfare state
or a strong communitarian, egalitarian political position. Instead, a widespread moti-
vation was a wish for children to have an educational experience that would prepare
them for a globalised, socially diverse, multicultural world. Sometimes this was
linked to parents’ active dislike for privileged educational routes on the grounds that
they were socially divisive, and their wish to avoid contributing to social division.
Often the higher-achieving secondary schools available to them were, in their view,
insufﬁciently socially and ethnically diverse and could not provide the sort of ‘real
world’ environment that would help realise a broad educational project and develop
their child in particular, valued directions.
The analysis differentiates between ﬁrst-generation, second-generation and estab-
lished middle-class families, as family history played a prominent role in school
choice and across these groups there were some important differences in the ratio-
nales given. However, taken as one group the parents concerned were distinctive in
a number of respects. A high proportion were educated to degree level (83%) and
around a quarter of these also held some kind of postgraduate qualiﬁcation. Most
(69%) were recent ‘incomers’ to the area in which they lived. In 70% of families, at
least one parent worked in the public sector. The parents in the study were strongly
represented on school governing bodies: There were 11 chairs of governors in the
sample, and in 57% of the London families at least one parent was currently serving
or had served as a school governor. Riverton and Norton ﬁgures were lower but still
substantial, at 43% and 22% respectively. In most cases, becoming a school gover-
nor was rooted in a desire to make a civic contribution, though as we found with the
many other explicit connections with schools (friendships with teachers or the Head,
or professional links with education), being a school governor was at the same time
a way of monitoring and intervening in schooling. In turn, schools seemed espe-
cially responsive to the wishes and concerns of white middle-class parents and their
children, and in part of the analysis of the project we argue that there was a
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particular mutual afﬁnity between the accountability needs of the school and the
wishes of this particular group of parents, a point returned to below.
An important strand in UK policy for the last 15 years or so has sought to place
schools at the heart of initiatives to realise greater social inclusion and to build a
greater sense of community: the Extended Schools initiative was one prominent
example of this (Cummings et al., 2007). Partly in the light of such policies, we
were interested to see whether ‘against the grain’ school choice made a positive con-
tribution to social mixing and, therefore, potentially, to social cohesion. We found
segregation within schools with white middle-class children clustered in top sets, in
most cases beneﬁting from ‘Gifted and Talented’ schemes,2 and little interaction
with children from other backgrounds. The children rarely had working-class friends
and their few minority ethnic friends were predominantly from middle-class back-
grounds. Overall, there was some evidence of social mix but little evidence of social
mixing. Parents often declared their hopes that their children would make friends
across ethnic groups, and sometimes they intervened to facilitate this, but on the
whole friends were other white middle-class children. Both parents’ and children’s
attitudes to classed and ethnic others sometimes displayed a perception of cultural
and intellectual superiority that would work against social cohesion and the develop-
ment of common ground and common understandings. For many of the parents in
the study (and especially in London) the wish for their children to have a multicul-
tural educational experience was closely connected to how they identiﬁed as white.
The data suggest that their own identity was constructed in opposition to that of both
white working-class people and those white middle-class people making more con-
ventional choices of secondary school. Rather, these parents saw themselves as part
of a more culturally tolerant and even anti-racist white middle class (see Reay et al.,
2007).
Against-the-grain school choice was for the most part experienced as a risky
strategy, and it generated considerable anxiety that we found was linked to parents’
attempts to monitor and manage the process (see Crozier et al., 2008). The accounts
of many of the parents suggested immense difﬁculties in acting ethically in an
unethical context. At the same time, however, we were surprised by the extent to
which both the speciﬁcity of school choice and more general issues of inequality
were seen in individualised, instrumental terms. Once under way, school experiences
were very closely monitored and managed, and some parents described how they
could and would ‘pull out’ if things did not go well, suggesting they saw school
choice as remaining provisional, and the school as a service provider and themselves
as consumers who could keep the choice of provider under review. Schooling was
seen as one element (albeit the largest element) in a broader educational project, and
this led us to suggest that the metaphor of a ‘risky investment’ was apposite. The
school choices made could and did produce high gains, but parents exercised high
levels of vigilance and often engaged in close monitoring through roles and relation-
ships that gave them close proximity to schooling.
Refusal of a mainstream misrecognition
In ‘mainstream choosing’, the measurement and comparison of a speciﬁc set of
secondary school examination results, together with published Inspection outcomes,
is intended by policy-makers to provide the information needed in a market in which
people will make informed choices. Middle-class parents appear to be the ideal
Cambridge Journal of Education 103
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consumers here because they are likely to be in a position to make choices that will
place their children in the best situation for academic achievement.3 General strate-
gies may include moving home before the date used by the local authority to deﬁne
place of residence, with the purpose of being nearer to (or further away from) a par-
ticular school. Some families move house well ahead of the period in which they
are required to ‘choose’, which when the day comes makes the choice appear
uncomplicated (in Bourdieusian tems, ‘natural’). Others will ﬁght hard for places in
speciﬁc, high-performing schools, and as well as house purchase and moving home
this may include renting an extra address, paying for private schooling, renewing
religious allegiances and so forth. The stakes are sufﬁciently high for some families
to resort to fraud or deception, such as using a false address so that they appear to
live closer to a desired school (BBC, 2008; Harvey, 2008).
In contrast to such strategies of ‘mainstream choosing’, the families in our sam-
ple were on the whole highly suspicious and/or critical of the main indicators via
which schools are compared, and of the associated league tables. Many felt that
dominant, conventional measures of school quality (particular groupings of the
results of General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education [GCSE] examinations) were
invalid as indicators of the quality of education on offer in any particular school,
since they would mainly depend on the school’s intake rather than on educational
processes. As one put it, they were interested in what their own child would achieve,
not what the class or year group would achieve. Our analysis here led us to suggest
that the policies designed to engender ‘choice’ and ‘markets’ operated with too
crude a conception of choice. In other words, they treat schooling as if it were the
same as buying a washing machine, and imply that all schools can be arranged, ulti-
mately, on a single continuum from best to worst. By contrast, the parents in our
study appeared to see schooling in much broader terms, as something more akin to
their only real shot, beyond the home, of shaping their child’s fundamental disposi-
tions, or habitus. We found Andrew Sayer’s distinction between preferences and
commitments (Sayer, 2005) especially useful in trying to grasp this gulf between
policy assumptions and actual practices in the realm of school choice:
What we have termed parental managerialism … sees parents putting great efforts into
constructing a broad educational project in which actual school choice is just one ele-
ment, albeit the most important single feature. Such parents have a commitment to par-
ticular notions of society and to particular kinds of socialisation: Their choices make
sense in relation to their commitments. (Reay, Crozier, & James, 2011, pp. 70–71)
The ‘particular kinds of socialisation’ are a frequent feature of the interview data,
and strongly linked to the parents’ own educational experiences. Examples include
parents describing their wishes thus:
I don’t want my children to think you know, that everybody’s got a holiday house in
Sardinia, and everyone’s daddy drives a four by four … and everyone you know can
go to tennis club and squash club and blah, blah, blah, have holidays skiing and this
that and the other. You know, they’ve got to realise that … not everyone does that,
we’re not all the same … and I just think, God, if everybody would just go to state
schools it would be so much better, but a lot of people don’t. (Audrey)4
There is deﬁnitely something about producing a different kind of middle-class child.
This is a speculation but I think there is deﬁnitely something about not being arrogant
or not appearing arrogant. There is some kind of modesty that some people might see
as them not being conﬁdent. You are not being educated to be a woman of the world;
you are being educated to take your part, a place. And I think there is an understanding
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of others you can only have if you are sort of with them all the time. It is something to
learn of other cultures, but to actually learn with other cultures, of other cultures, it is a
completely different thing. (Avril)
The interviews are peppered with examples that speak of a much greater educational
project than that signalled by examination outcomes, and a common element of this
was a desire to avoid the perceived (and, often, formerly experienced) social homo-
geneity of more selective school settings so as to create a more resilient, socially ﬂu-
ent young person equipped to thrive in a multicultural society. There was also
disdain for those other parents who appeared driven by league table position in their
choice of secondary school. In sum, then, these parents are ‘seeing through’ the
myth of the market, refusing to reduce something as complex as an educational pro-
cess to the dominant single indicator of quality, and acting in accordance with some
strongly held values and conceptions of the educational project.
The persistence of misrecognition
However, our analysis also suggests that, in the convoluted relationship between
social class, education and inequality, the attempt to act ethically in unethical cir-
cumstances produces social practices characterised by other forms of misrecognition.
In one interview, we had been talking about whether, in retrospect, the choice of
school had been a good one to have made:
Father: I feel vindicated...
Mother: Yes, I do (too)
Father: … in that because our feeling is that we’re not interested in results, we’re not
interested in percentages of A–Cs, what we’re interested in is what our own
children are going to achieve. So it could be that a year group do appallingly,
but if the teachers have given our children the opportunity to rise to their nat-
ural place and get the qualiﬁcations that they’re capable of, a good teacher
will work with children and if they have one bright child in that class they
should be able to take them where they need to go. (Tom & Trudy – emphases
added)
The interviews with parents contained many mentions of ‘bright’ and ‘brightness’,
plus a number of close synonyms including having something ‘extra’ or being ‘spe-
cial’. This was linked to certainty about capability and key elements of the child’s
future trajectory, and also sometimes to denigration of the white working class, and
a contrasting admiration for the ‘bright and ambitious’ amongst some minority
ethnic children. Middle-class ‘brightness’ was the main way in which middle-class
distinction was characterised and expressed:
Across 251 interview transcripts there were a staggering 256 references to brightness,
made by parents, and to a lesser extent their children, without prompting by the inter-
viewers. We would argue that such discourses, which position middle-class brightness
as both normative and a justiﬁcation for middle-class privilege, are one of the main
means through which the middle classes defensively use their own investments in class
hierarchies to distinguish themselves as superior to others…. Brightness then becomes
a rationalisation for holding on to more: educationally, socially and economically.
Furthermore, investment in brightness defends against the fear of failure. For the white
middle classes educational failure is often intolerable and needs to be projected
elsewhere. (Reay, Crozier, & James, 2011, pp. 117–118)
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It would not be unreasonable to say that, collectively, most of these ‘against the
grain’ choosers were so conﬁdent about the brightness of their children that they felt
justiﬁed in making the riskier investment in the average or lower-performing second-
ary school. This may be described using the Freudian notion of ‘splitting’ (in which
information that challenges the integrity of the ego is dealt with by disavowal: so
any responsibility for inequalities, being shameful, is projected onto subordinate
groups). On the other hand (or as well) it can be understood as a form of misrecog-
nition, a regular feature of educational processes, in which the institutional welcome,
nurturance and certiﬁcation of certain sets of dispositions (relative to others) is
reinterpreted as the result of natural difference rather than socially maintained difference.
In other words, in the right circumstances, children will ‘rise to their natural place’.
This theme is closely linked to another, which we called the mutual afﬁnity
apparent between the relatively isolated white-middle class child in many of the
schools, and the needs of the schools in highly performative conditions. To put it
crudely, head teachers wanted middle-class kids and would go to great lengths to
attract and keep them. Meanwhile, parents were quite demanding of teachers and
head teachers, and many of their demands were met: they got a particularly good
‘service’, often bolstered, as mentioned earlier, with the extra resources coming
through the ‘Gifted and Talented’ scheme. Both parents and schools were acting – at
least indirectly - with knowledge derived from social science concerning the
relationship of social class and educational outcomes.
The concept of misrecognition, then, helps us to unpack a series of partially
shared rationales amongst the parents and families, in which they rejected GCSE
results, a mainstream indicator of quality of secondary schooling, because of its poor
compass in relation to what they valued about schooling. At the same time, the con-
cept of misrecognition enabled an exploration of other senses in which parents’ per-
ceptions of the young person and engagements with the school (and education more
generally) appeared to serve their interests well beyond those that were immediately
apparent. This suggests it would be a mistake to see parents like those in the study
who have rejected ‘league table thinking’ as simply more enlightened than their
mainstream-chooser counterparts. There may well be a complex array of other types
of misrecognition at stake in the relationship between middle-class families and
schools. To put this another way, it may take more than a rejection of ‘league table
thinking’ to challenge or even disturb the intricate and convoluted processes by
which, from a Bourdieusian perspective, social difference is converted through edu-
cational action so that it appears naturally-occurring and thoroughly explicable via
reference to individual differences in motivation and intelligence. As some earlier
work in Finland demonstrated, notions of intelligence are a fundamental building-
block in educational discourse and representations of educability (see Raty &
Snellman, 1998).
Reﬂexivity and recognising tensions
As a team conducting the above project we commented that the project had been:
… a difﬁcult, sometimes painful process. Many of the research team could be
described as white, urban-dwelling, ﬁrst-generation middle class. Researching the white
middle classes was often like holding a mirror to the self. We were confronted with
our own culpability, failings, conceits and self-deceptions. (Reay, Crozier, & James,
2011, p. 167)
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This kind of reﬂexivity is important and, in Bourdieusian terms, central to achieving
any kind of scientiﬁc insight (Grenfell & James, 1998). What does it really mean to
be sociologically reﬂexive if one is deeply engaged in educational activities? I want
to suggest that there is a fundamental dissonance between a Bourdieusian approach
and some widely held values and goals of educational endeavour (and some educa-
tional research), and that these can be articulated as four ‘areas of tension’.
First, there are tensions around interest and proximity. In educational research,
many are accustomed to regarding personal or professional proximity to educational
processes as a bonus, albeit one that needs careful handling. The whole ‘teacher as
researcher’ tradition, and much of the work collectively known as ‘action research’
in the educational community, relies heavily on the longstanding methodological
pivot of dealing with familiarity by making it strange (see for example Atkinson,
et al., 2003; Sikes, 2003, 2006). However, in Bourdieu’s social theory, this is not
enough. To do social science, we need to achieve an analysis of our own position
vis-à-vis the object of study. This means recognising that as, say, teachers we have
interests that limit what we (and a good number of other teachers) can easily see.
The same point can be made in respect of parents, children, policy-makers, politi-
cians, civil servants and indeed researchers. There is a need, one might say, to make
the strange familiar. Where someone is accustomed to seeing their daily and strenu-
ous efforts as an educator in generally positive terms, it will seem difﬁcult and quite
possibly perverse to be asking in what sense they are part of a system that generates
inequalities.
Second, there are tensions around the unit of analysis. In education, although
people usually do things in groups, we are accustomed to dealing with individuals,
who are the prime unit of nurturing, encouragement, achievement, reward, celebra-
tion, accountability and so forth. This is partly an observation about Anglo-Saxon
culture, but we should note that the growth of psychology (and especially educa-
tional psychology and, within this, psychometrics) is roughly conterminous with the
rise of state educational provision, and there is a longstanding interweaving of psy-
chological concepts, measurements and conceptions of the person in educational
policy, especially in assessment. This is probably one reason that individualistic con-
ceptions of the self, which are axiomatic in neo-liberal thinking, appear to be
accepted in many educational settings. This is not to say Bourdieu was uninterested
in individuals: he put enormous amounts of effort into emancipatory projects that
sought to improve the lives of many people. Rather, it is to make a more mundane
but crucial point, which is that individuals are not the primary unit of analysis for
Bourdieu. As he once put it:
The socialized body (what is called the individual or the person) is not opposed to
society: it is one of its forms of existence. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 15)
Those dealing mainly in educational practice and policy may object to knowledge
and insight that refers to people not as individuals qua individuals, but for their part
in social practices which are indicative of ﬁelds, capitals, positions, relationships or
tendencies. Following Mey (1972), I would liken this perspectival ‘shift to the rela-
tional’ to that between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. However, some in educa-
tion will ﬁnd it disrespectful or otherwise objectionable that social researchers do
not always take the testimony of participants at face value, or impute motives that
people themselves do not directly express, acknowledge or even recognise. Thus,
practices that appear self-evidently good or ‘the way things are’ in an educational
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setting might, from another perspective, show themselves to both respond to and
reproduce structural inequalities.
Third, and related to the above, there are tensions around compass or scale.
Whilst a sociological account drawing on Bourdieu may attempt to theorise how
aspects of home background give advantages to some students and disadvantages to
others, the boundaries of the issue will need to be more tightly drawn where it is
considered as a problem for educational practice or policy. To put this another way,
even if practitioners and policy-makers accept the Bourdieusian account, what
elements of the complex array of practices, structures and relationships would they
consider are in their purview? What are the excellent teachers in a relatively
low-attaining school to take from an account that shows that their efforts can amount
to so little in mainstream terms? For all its practical derivation and relevance, the
compass of a Bourdieusian analysis is not, in this instance at least, likely to lend
itself to ‘reading off’ recipes for action.
This brings us to the fourth – and arguably most important – tension between an
analysis derived from Bourdieu’s theoretical tools, and the worlds of education, edu-
cational practitioners and to some extent educational researchers. I will call this a
tension around tenor, and it centres on a deceptively simple distinction between opti-
mism and pessimism. Whilst many working in education have become highly
disillusioned, many others have not, and both popular and academic literatures on
teaching and leadership continue to underline the importance of enthusiasm and
other forms of positivity. In addition, a diverse range of initiatives bear witness to a
seemingly inexhaustible appetite for innovation. Some initiatives are large scale and
‘top down’ (e.g. policies like Every Child Matters, and Extended Schools in the
UK) whilst others are more local and ‘bottom up’ (e.g. the Royal Society of Arts’
Area Based Curriculum in the UK – see James, 2012). Yet others are best under-
stood as the ‘bottom up’ invention and performance of ‘top down’ requirements (see
for example Jones and Thomson’s excellent analysis of the now-terminated Creative
Partnerships scheme in England – Jones & Thomson, 2008). Perhaps due to the
absence of shared purposes at the system level (Pring et al., 2009), an endemic
reluctance to engage in problematising the ends of education or a tendency to priori-
tise technical over cultural aspects in collecting and using evidence of ‘what works’
(Biesta, 2007), these movements often encapsulate a collective imagination of what
education could be or should be. For a time they appear to hold out the possibility
of great change for the better in schooling, and/or solutions to problems that go well
beyond the normal functions of schooling. For some of those involved, such
educational visions are congenitally, sometimes infectiously, optimistic about what
is possible and achievable through educational processes.
Through a Bourdieusian lens, such movements continually overestimate the
capacity to act to bring about genuine change. Arguably, this tells us as much about
Bourdieu’s social theory as it does about the interests, values and world-views of
educationists. Bourdieu’s approach is largely a sociology of domination, bringing
with it a strong concept of power, and whilst there is plenty of scope for agency it
also illustrates limits and tends towards pessimism. This has been noted many times,
by both critics and advocates of Bourdieu’s approach. An early example of the for-
mer would be Paul Willis, for whom Bourdieu ‘presents, ﬁnally, a gloomy, enclosed
Weberian world of no-escape. There is no theoretical basis for a politics of change,
for the production of alternatives or radical consciousness’ (Willis, 1983, p. 121)
(though as Walker argues, this overstates the case and Willis’s own grounds for
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optimism can be shown to rely on an unwarranted romantic view of a particular
form of working-class culture – see Walker, 2007). Even one of the most positive
accounts of Bourdieu’s work notes ‘an element of fatalism or, perhaps of reluctant
cosmic conservatism’ (Robbins, 1991, p. 175). Yet whilst there can be little doubt
that Bourdieu represents a tendency to pessimism, it would be wrong to see this a
some kind of theoretical fatal ﬂaw, for three reasons. First, until we have ﬁrmer
grounds for optimism, the tendency may be warranted (cf. Walker, 2007); second,
the tendency does not of itself prevent change-for-the better; and third, to position it
as a ‘ﬂaw’ would suggest a banal and mistaken view of the nature of Bourdieusian
theory. Many (including Bourdieu himself) have pointed out that the work does not
offer a grand theoretical system, but rather it is a set of related theoretical tools
(albeit an ‘impressively consistent’ one – Calhoun, 2014) developed over time via
empirical work.
Conclusion
I started by indicating that, when it comes to Bourdieu, there is great variety in
‘depth-in-use’, and that some connections that are made with Bourdieu’s concepts in
educational research are superﬁcial. Such usage probably helps to sustain suspicions
– outside and sometimes inside academic institutions – that when it comes to
educational matters, theory is some kind of optional, ultimately dispensable, gloss.
However, ‘light’ usage may not always indicate a lack of application or seriousness
on the part of the researcher. First, it may be a product of the ease with which
Bourdieusian concepts can be confused with others that sound similar, a point I have
illustrated with the concept of misrecognition. Second, and as indicated by the four
potential areas of tension identiﬁed, there is much scope for the misrecognition (in
the true Bourdieusian sense) of this especially strong form of sociological reasoning
when it clashes with elements of the doxa of the educational ﬁeld, including many
ﬁrmly held values. When educationists become critical social researchers, they must
ﬁnd ways of reconciling or living with such tensions; they must begin to subject
themselves and their educational assumptions to new forms of scrutiny, to take steps
to ‘dislodge their thinking’ (Stich, 2012). The task here is so much more than the
conventionally understood one of trying to minimise the distorting effects of one’s
values (Greenbank, 2003) and its difﬁculty cannot be overstated, as many a former
or current teacher on an education-related Doctoral programme would testify. There
is evidence that it is worth the struggle and the end results can be distinctive,
practical and worthwhile (see e.g. Anyon et al., 2009; James, 2010).
It would appear that there is no such thing as a convincing ‘light’ adoption of
Bourdieusian tools. They cannot be used as if we were ignorant or unconcerned
about how, in schools and other settings, educational processes naturalise social dif-
ferences. Their use entails acknowledgement that people working in education may
be unwitting (or perhaps, semi-witting) agents of inequality, whatever their motives
and despite what else their actions achieve. Furthermore, a Bourdieusian perspective
includes considering how, like other professionals, educationists (and educational
researchers) will have collective interests that include maintaining certain arrange-
ments and a demand for their services. Whilst the approach can provide great
insight, its tendency to produce pessimism may dampen some of the enthusiasm that
is so often a fundamental constituent of educational endeavour, whether at classroom
or policy level. For such reasons, even the most reﬂexive educational professional
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and the most broad-minded educational policy-maker are likely to ﬁnd Bourdieusian
research difﬁcult to ‘do’ and difﬁcult to ‘hear’, regardless of how ultimately
practical or useful it might actually be.
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Notes
1. Both ‘Riverton’ and ‘Norton’ are pseudonyms.
2. Described at the time of the study on the UK Government Department for Children,
Schools and Families ‘Standards’ website thus: ‘Gifted and talented children are those
who have one or more abilities developed to a level signiﬁcantly ahead of their year
group (or with the potential to develop these abilities). In England the term “gifted”
refers to those pupils who are capable of excelling in academic subjects such as English
or History. “Talented” refers to those pupils who may excel in areas requiring
visio-spatial skills or practical abilities, such as in games and PE, drama, or art’. The
Guidance Note Identifying Gifted and Talented Learners – getting started was revised in
2008 and is now available at https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDown
load/Getting%20StartedWR.pdf (accessed January 11, 2014).
3. The system in England combines choice and entitlement. See https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/203,221/Schools_Choice_Framework.
pdf (accessed January 11, 2014).
4. All participants are given pseudonyms.
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